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MAl~ FIL£ COPY 
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S\5eech of Senator Mike Mansfield (D . , Montana) 
For Release on Delivery 
F0'? R~LFASE 
Ff. 1 6 1956 
REVIEW OF FOREiGN POLICY - II 
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Mr. President: 
In recent weeks members of the Sanate have add.res sed themselves 
to the question of the need for a review of th~ foreign policies of the nation. 
When I discussed the question here in the Senate on January 2 0th, I made this 
statement: 
I intend to raise the issues of foreign policy 
on the floor at intervals throughout the session . I hope 
to do so in the spirit of national responsibility and with-
out challenging the integrity or the pat.riotisrn of any 
individual o r the political party now in control of t_hc 
Executive Branch of th~ government. I will b(; only too 
glad to give credit, whc:e credit is due . By th~ same 
token, however, I do not propose to ignore or glcs s 
over the shortcomings, weaknesses and inadequacies of 
foreign policy as I see them. 
Mr. President, it is in that spirit that I shall attempt to make a 
contribution to the review today. 
Let me begin by saying that I believe that the;re is only one valid 
justification for the enormous and costly responsibilities which this country has 
assumed throughout the world in the last decade. Peace for this country has 
become increasingly inseparable from peace everywhere. The fate of our free-
dom is linked to that of freedom elsewhere in the world. 
I do not share the views of those who contend that some sort of 
mystical world leadership compels us to act abroad in every situation. I do not 
agree with those who hold that we must asG crt this l eadership by flexing our 
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nuclear or vocal muscles at the slightest provocation. Nor do I agre e with 
those who argue that this same leadcrsh1p requires us to spend billions simply 
to prove that we are m o re generous than the Russians. 
On the other hand, I have no comrr.on ground with those who 1gnore 
the vast changes wh1ch have take n place in tha international po::lition of the 
United States. We are in this world -- this small, crowded, dangerous and 
promising world - - whethe r we like it or not. No ancient dream of iso lated 
splendor will insulate us from its currents. That was a fin~ dream and an 
appealing one, that nin<.tet.nth century dr~am of a safe and contented America, 
removed from the troubles of the rest of the wo rld. It has not been the l e ade rs 
- - Republicans or Democrats - - in the White House or the Department of State 
who have shattered it, Rather, it has bee n the sc4entists and the te chnologists 
of whom this country has produced its share and of whom we arc justifiably proud. 
For those -- and I belie ve only a few remain -- for those who still persist in 
that dream of isolation, unmoved by the jet planes and guided missiles overhead, 
I suppose there will be no awakening except for that instant of reality before some 
nuclear holocaust blasts us all into extinction . 
What I am trying to say is that the United States cannot escape 
from the r ealities of this era of human histot<y . If we cannot r<..tr~at into a 
nonexistent Fol'trt::s s America, however, neither can we charge out in every 
direction with bombast, billions or bombs. If we are to have eff(;.ctive policies, 
it seems to me that we cannot assume that ..!ither action or inaction in for e ign 
policy is of itself good or desirable. We have got to measure every major 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 38, Folder 10, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 3 -
activity against two general standards. Does the activity contribute to the 
preservation of peace and the security of freedom? Does it contribute to these 
ends in reasonable degree commeneurate with the costs? 
It is against those two standards that I ask the Senate today to 
examine with me the policies which we a r e following in Southeast Asia. We do 
not lack for information on the situation there. The American press has per -
form e d a great public servic~ in keeping the nation infcrmed on developments in 
the region. It is a region, m~1reov(..r, which Senators in increasing numbers have 
visit~d in rec~nt years so that even from within our own midst we have several 
first-hand observations . 
I recall meeting the distinguishldd mincrity l~ader /Mr . Knowland7 
there in 1953 and I know that th~ able Senatur from Washington j_M1·. Jackson/ 
has only recldntly returned from the area. Others who come readily to mind as 
having visited the area in recent years include the Senator from Rhode Island 
{M.r . Gree!!.?· the Senator from Iowa j_Mr . Hickenloope.:_7, the Senato r from New 
Hampshire !_~fr. Bridge_!/, the Senator from Illinois {M.r . Dirksen/, the Senator 
from New Jersey {M.r . Smit~7. the Senator from Louisiana {M.r. Ellend e.:_7, the 
Senator from Washington [M.r. Magnuson/, th~ Senator from Kentucky {M.r. 
Clements 7, and others. 
Until r ecent years Scutheast Asia has been on the whole remote from 
our awareness. Except for the Philippines over which this country exe r cised 
sov~reignty, the area was la r gely a pr-eserve of the European powers. For 
decades and in some cases centuries, ancient nations of the region were colonies, 
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The United Kingdom held Burma, Malaya, Smgapore, Ceylon and others. In 
Indochina, the French were predominant. Indon.;sia was under Dutch control. 
The Portuguese ruled in several areas . 
Whatever its virtues, colonialism produc~d the enmities of inequality. 
It produced Lhese enmities in varying degrees among all the peoples of Southeast 
Asia. It produced them generally in direct ratio to the reluctance of the European 
powers to provide avenues to eventual equality and freedom for these peoples. 
Let us face that fact in all honesty. The past is past but we shall 
never bury it until we are prepared to face it . There w<::re reasons why regions 
of Asia became colonial preserves. It will not serve the cause of present 
understanding fvr us in the Western world to delude ourselves \l..ith the pious 
belief that onl y selfless motives led to the expansion of Western influence into 
Asia. There were such motives to be sure; but there was also the excessive zeal 
for gain and power which characterized the Western nations, including Russia, 
in the nineteenth century . 
By the same token, it will not serve the cause of present understanding 
for this generation of Asians to ignore the shortcomings which existed in their 
countries at the time they became colonies . Nor will it serve that cause for them 
to turn their backs now on the real social and economic contributions which the 
Western nations have made to their societies. 
It comes with particular ill-grace to find the present Soviet leaders 
attempting - - as Messrs. Khrushchev and Bulganin did on their recent Asian tour 
- - to find them attempting to pour salt on thea e old sores of colonialism. Have 
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they forgotten that their forebears were among the most voracious in extending 
Western domination in Asia? And for all their words about national independence, 
there is little indication that the present Soviet lead~rs have abandoned the 
predatory habits of their fathers. We will look in vain in Cuntral Asia for some 
tangible evidence that they have. What subject people of the Russians hav~ direct 
contact with the new Asian nations to the south and cast? 
Whatever may have b eet> the situation prior to World V'ar II, the fact 
is that Western colonialism is deatl o r dying throuehout Southeast Asia. The 
Southeast Asia of yesterday is no mo r e . Where once there were colonies, there 
are now free nations -- some t e n of them within a compass marl<od roughly by 
China on the north, tho:: Pan::c o n the east, Australia on the south and India on the 
west. 
ThiJ r .;gion of Southeast Asia is the size of Western Europe and is 
even less populated. It is rich in minerals a~d petroleum and it contains some 
of the most fertile agricultural lands in the world. 
Although ~ach is a diotinct n.~t~onal entity, the ~ounlries of Southeast 
Asia 
A.r~J linked by ties which grow out of a common heritage and many common prob -
lems. Together these countries make U? one of tht.:: major political r egions of the 
world. And together wtth other peoples in A!Jia and Africa - -new nations and 
nations coming into being -- they constitute a powerful force in the flow of world 
events . 
That was the significance of the na11dung Conference of Asian -
African nations last year. It was not, as som0 treated it, a popularity contest 
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between the Soviet Union and ourselves. It is true that we were criticized by 
several of the nations at the conference and we wcr..: praised by others . So, too, 
were the Russians. We were elat~d at the praise and d1smayed by the cntlcism. 
So, too, presumably were the Russians. I supposl.l that is understandable . It 
seems to me, however, that if we wish to develop sound policies, we would do 
well to concern ourselves less with applause and criticism which are the food 
and gall of actors and more with the d~eper !orces which are ope rating in these 
countries. We can hardly hupe to comp--te with lhe Russians as actors; I trusl 
that thoc;c responsible fur thz conduct of this nation's foreign policy can excel 
them in statesmanship and sincerity . 
The deeper forcl.!s which motivate Southeast Asia Wl.lre clearly re -
vealed at Bandung and they are refle<'ted in the p0licics of virtually all the 
nations of that region. They are forces which arise from a deep devotion to 
national independence, from a desire for progress in a material sense and from 
a more distant, but noneth .... lcss real, goal of ~t:sponsibl(; and humane government. 
These aro forces powerful and swcepmg enough to drive millions of people into 
action. There are other factorc; -- ideologies and dream:; of anci~..-nt grandeur, 
for example. These af£~..-ct thl.! situation in Southeast Asia. 'Th<'y sometimes tend 
to obscure the hasic forcl.ls hut they do not change them. 
National independence, matcri<:>.l progress and rcspvnsible and humane 
government - - these art! th .... drives whtch hav~ spurred the vast changccs in South-
east Asia during the past decade. And th .... y •vill c<,ntinu ... tc dominate 
developments in that r egion in the decades thal lie ahead. 
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The policies of this country must take these forces fully into con-
sideration. They must also take into conside1 at ion still another factor. Each 
government in Southeast Asia has its own concepts 0f how to pursue its national 
objectives. Sometimes these concepts will not be in accord with our own . When 
there are variations between their vi~ws and uur s as to how to proceed, we can 
propound, we can propose, and w e can palliate . There is one course we cannot 
afford to take, in all duo r e spect to their incep~ndence and our national dignity. 
Wi! cannot aff0rd to follow a foreign policy based on pique or plcasur~ with the 
words of this Asian leader or that. What wr.., r\o now in uur relations with South-
east Asia will have a significance for this country long after thu contemporary 
l eade rs both there and here have passed from the scene. 
Mor ~ important than curr{;nt diso.g;:eements ove r .nethods and per-
sonalities is the !act that th~re is nolhing inconsistent a s between the objectives 
of the Southeast Asian peoph: and our l ong-rang~:: interests. Their objectives are 
in many ways a replica of our own basic national as pi rations . We too have 
struggled through re 11olution and wars to establish and to preserve national 
independence. We too havl! sought material progress from the earliest days of 
our history . We too have worked to p0rf-.!ct our political institutions . 
As the ne w nations of South'-ast Asia progress toward their basic 
objectives, this nation gains 1n the process. Why is that the case? To begin 
with, one of our principal concerns witn respect to Southeast Asia is a s e curity 
interest. It is a legitimate interest, for it was into the weakn<..ss of Southeast 
As1a that the militarists of World War II pcndratcd as a pr econdition for their 
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attack on the United Stato:::s . As the Southeast Asian nations strengthen the bases 
of their independence , our own security is increased. 
We also have an interest in the material development of Southeast 
Asia. The people of Asia are not without their genius and creative energy. 
Their magnificent achievements of the past - - and there are many ·- suggest 
the dynamic contribution which these people can make to the general enrichment 
of mankind in the modern era. Out of their development, moreover, can come 
growing opportnnities for mutually beneficial trade and exchange. Our total 
commerce with Western Europe , an area of comparable size and population, was 
over $7 billion in 1955. With Southeast Asia, it was $3 billion. The difference 
only begins to suggest the ultimate possibilities of trade if Southeast Asia 
develops in an economic sense. 
We have finally an interest in the political progress of Southeast Asia. 
Let me emphasize, however, the distinction between interest and interference in 
these matters. It is one thmg to look with sympathy on the adoption of American 
concepts of democracy by others. It is another to attempt to sell these concepts 
to them. A number of the new governments of Southeast Asia reflect the influence 
of the American Constitution, the Declaration of Inde pende nce and other great 
state papers. That is a mark of recognition of the universality of our greatest 
political minds. It ought to be a suurce of both prid0 and humility to this 
generation of Americans. It is a disgraceful disrespect, however, to talk of 
exporting our system of gove rnm e nt or the A·neric'ln way as though it were some 
article of commerce to be marketed by Madisc,n Av· nuc. 
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Let the Chinese and oth..:r communist nations persist in that false 
sense of mission which requires them to force their own peculiar systems on the 
unreceptive. It does not serve the interests or the dignity of this country to 
suggest that we emulate it. 
There arc signs that over the past decade the Southeast Asian 
count r ies have movii!d towa-rds a ll th r ee of their basic objectives. I bas.: this 
observation on my vis;t t<"' Southeast Asia last fall and on reports by other 
members of Congt·~s3 and by press cor r e:spondents . The r 0 are l imited but 
unmistakable signs of progr..:ss . In most countries a tolerable measure of 
internal o r der now pr evails o Th<:l great thr<..at of a communist Tr'!il itary advance 
through Indochina into the balance of Southeast Asia has receded, at least for 
the moment. Production of crops is rising . New industries are being developed . 
Commodities from Japan and the Western nations are appearing in the mar kets 
of Southeast Asia in increaned supply . Perhaps most significant, free elections 
were held last year in virtually ev..;ry count r y in the region . In s ome cases, 
these were the firs t general elections wi th unive r sal suffrage eve r to take pl ace 
in these nations . Whatever their shor tcomings, they typify the zealous sear ch 
for more responsible government which is going on in most of the Southeast Asian 
countries o 
We shall make a tragic error, however, i£ we tak11 the first signs 
of progress as assurance of a secure future fe-r Southeast Asia . Th e area is a 
long way from that . The shadow of tht:: militant Chin~se colossus still s lants 
across its neighbors to the south. A l ull iu the conflict in Indochina is no 
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guarantee that it shall not be resumed by the communists in the near future. A 
satisfactory rate of economic d~velopment by ~ven the most dementary standards 
is still lacking in most of the countrh:s, Some of thz governments in the area are 
plagued by a corruption and in-.:rtia ·.vhich tend to Oj)er. rc.the r than narrow the 
gulf between then1 and the~r peoples. 
W ·::. have, I believe, played some small part in the progress of 
Southeast Asia. Our policies with respect to Southeast Asia have been effective 
to the extent that tht:y hav...: b..!en in harmony with thE:: fundamental objectives of 
the peoples of that area. They have been effuctive to the extP.nt that they have 
supported the desire for secure national independence, for material progress, 
and for r espor1sible political institutivns. 
Mr. President, I should like now to turn to the rrajor aspects of 
these policies and to their shortcomings as I see them. Let me say first that I 
r ecognize that policy for Southeast Asia cannot be divorced from consideration of 
policy elsewhere. The Administration, for example, may have r easons for 
continuing -- as it has done --for continuing conversations between an American 
Ambassador and a Chines e Communist r epresentative for seven months in Geneva. 
There may be reasons, reasons which the Administration has not seen fit to make 
public, reasons of which the Senate is not aware. Nev~rthPll:!ss, I know that 
these conversations must be a cause of uneasiness to many members of the 
Senate. 
In the same way, they are a source of uncertainty in many countries 
in Southeast Asia. Questions naturally arioe there as wt!ll as in the Senate as to 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 38, Folder 10, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 11 -
where these conversati0ns are leading. Thay have the effe ct of introducing a 
note of uncertainty into all of our policies in that area. 
The conversations effect also the large overseas Chinese population 
in Southeast Asia, numbc:ring several millions, who are s~ttled in communities 
like Singapore , Djakarta and Bangkok. The loyalties of these communities have 
teetered betwe: cn Peking and Formosa for a decade . What this country does or 
does not do respecting the Chinese Communist 1·egime exercises a very great 
influence on them . 
I repeat I dv not question the right o f the Administration to talk with 
the Chinese Communists, if it so desires. I me r ely point to these conversations 
as one example of how act ions by this government presumably made necessary 
by conditions e ls e whe re hav-.: an inevitable impact on our policies in Southeast 
Asia. One c ould also point to olh~.:rs a5, for example, the conditions which grow 
out of our clo se relations with Western European natio ns. These relations have 
sometimes led to actions o r s taterrents affecting Southeast Asia which have been 
-- to say the l east -- not wdl r eceived thl.!re. 
In the absence of full information, we must assume that the 
Executlve Branch would not make adjustments of this kind if they were avoidable. 
It seems to me, how eve r, that even whe n due allo wance is made for the 
unavoidable, our policies fo r Southeast Asia remain characterized by an 
inad~quacy of understanding and an inertia of ideas . 
The principal instrument of po licy through which we have: attempted 
to assist th0 nations of SoutlH.ast Asia in maintaining th~ir independence is the 
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treaty that bears the r.ame of the region. At the request of the President, I was 
a delegate to the Manila Conft:rencc at which the Southeast Asia ddense treaty 
was drawn up. Togctht;.; r with the Secretary of State and the distinguished 
Senator from New Jersey j_Mr. Smit!:7 I signed ~he tr~:aty on h~half of the 
United States. The Senate gave its consent to ratification by a vote of 82 to l. 
If the Senate will recall the situahon which existed in 1954 when the 
treaty was considered, its significance will b~ appreciated. It was signed at a 
time when the communist drive into Indochina thr!o:atened to spill over into the 
r est of Southeast Asia. The treaty was int-.!ndcd primarily to rally the will of 
other Asian nations to protect their indcpendeoct; and to resist a further advance 
o f communist t.:>talitarianism. 
I sig.1ed that treaty and I cast my vote for its ratification. I did so 
with a full awareness of its limitations. 
~ 
I signed because I believed the treaty served a usefnl purpose in 
terms of this nation's interest in peace and in freedom. 1 believe it continues 
to do so. And so long as we remain a party to it, the obligations which we have 
assumed under it must remain inviolate. 
Situations changt.:, however, and as they do we must be prepared to 
adjust this treaty as well as other policies accordingly. The principal limitation 
of the treaty when it was signed, as it is now, is that it carries too heavy a 
reliance for the defense of Southeast Asia on nations outside the area. It has, 
moreover, yet to secure the participation of nations lik0 India, Burma, Ceylon 
and Indoncs i a whose i.nterests in th<! area arc in many ways more. direct than our 
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own. Finally, it has aroused some fears in Southea st Asia that the o l d ghost 
of Western colonialism may emerge in a new form . These fears are unfounded 
but we cannot ignore their effect on the nations which have them . 
The limitations of the treaty have never been a secret. They have 
been discuss cd many times in the press. What disturbs me is not so much the 
limitations themselves as the apparent unwillingness of the Executive B r anch to 
face them and its inertia in taking steps to deal with them. 
In addition Lo the Southeast Asia defense treaty, this country is 
supplying military aid to a number of countrie s in th~ region to assist them in 
building the defenses of their national ind<.;peudence . I have supported p r ograms 
of assistance of tnis hnd. On repeatl:ld occasions , however, I have str essed the 
need for extreme cautio n and responsibility in employing this arm of foreign 
policy . That such cautiun and responsibility were not being employed became 
unmistakably clear to me last summer when I brought to the attention of the 
Senate the ~hoddy procodures in allocating funds under these programs. The 
s~nate will r~call that of some $3 billion appropriated for the year for military 
aid, the De.fense Departmt::nt obligated about $700 million, or roughly 25 percent 
of these funds, in the last 24 hours of th<..ir expiring autho't'ity to do so . 
We have got to fac e the fact that military aid is a two -edged swo r d. 
We have been told many times of its virtues. We have not b<:en sufficiently 
alerted to its dangers. 
I tell the Senate in all candidness that I was dismayed at some of the 
reports from responsible quarters which reached me while I was in Southeast Asia. 
According to these reports, not a small part of the w~apons used in the Viet Minh 
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advance in Vietnam and Laos were of American manufacture. They had com\! 
inlo communist hands via d-.:f~.;ctions and d.:deats of forces we had armed, via the 
smuggling trade in weapons and by supply hon1 Communist China. 
I do not know how significant this factor of w~apons supplied by us 
being turned against us and friendly nations is in the total picture in Asia. 
Perhaps we shall nevc1· know. One thing is certain, however, that it is not 
without significance and I have yet to s.;e those who are 1·esponsiblc for the 
administration of thest:J aid programs demonstrate sufficient awareness of its 
significance. 
I believe this body cannot emphasize too strongly the need of extreme 
caution in tendering military aid lo any country. At the least, I believe we must 
make certain that it goes to governments or.ly in quantities and cf a kind that 
they can use effectively to med a ge::nuine military threat. I believe further that 
it should go to governments that are striving, as in South VietNam and the 
Philippines, to base themselves strongly in their own peoples. In the long run, 
only such governments are lik~ly to survive in Southeast Asia and only such 
governments make reliable allies. 
I turn now to the second major aspect of American policy respecting 
Southeast Asia which is aid-other - than-military. I apologize to the Senate for 
tht:! Uije of this cumbersome term but I can finu no other. Aid - other -than -
military, as I use it, embraces such euphonies as di.rect forces support, defense 
support, development assistance, technical assistance, the President's Fund for 
Asian economic developml.!nl, all of which hav.! bo.:..en coinC;d to describe various 
activities of the government in piClVLJing assistanc~:: ai.Jroad. 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 38, Folder 10, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
.. 
- 15 -
I mention these terms not to embarnass the lexicographers of the 
Executive Branch but merely to er.nphasize what I be lieve to be the major 
problem in this aspect of our policy. The "aid-other-than-military" program 
in Southeast Asia, in a phrase, is bogged down in bureaucracy. 
I believ~ assistance programs have a place in the foreign policies 
of this government, provid~d the emphasis is on mutuality, provided they fill a 
genuine need, and provided they are judiciously and e xpertly administe r ed. I 
have seen technical assistance programs run on under a million dollars as in 
Nepal several 'years ago . Tht:re a handful of Amel'ican technicians were per -
forming an admirable service in the interests of that country and the United 
States. I hav~ s.Jen o thers invelving tens of millions of do llars which were the 
height of futility. 
I r .. ~ peat, I believe this country can serve its own interests as well 
as those of Southeast Asian countries through aid programs hut the level of 
expenditures is not ' the real measure of utility. It is the manner in which funds 
are exp~nd~d that is the critical is sue. 
I tell the Senate frankly that I am disturbed when I am told - - as I was 
told s e ve ral months ago -- by the Prime Ministe r of a Southeast Asian country 
that "the improv~mcnt in r e latio ns betw~::en your country and mine dates f r om the 
discontinuance at my request of your aid program. 11 
What lies behmd a comment like that made in all sincerity by an 
outstanding Asian lt;adcr '! How are we to reconc ile this fact with requests fr om 
the Ex~cutive Branch for long - range aid programs and increased expenditures? 
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I belie ve we mus t go back to the fundamental drive s in Southe a s t Asia 
if we are to unde rstand the P rime Ministe r ' s c omment and the existing short -
comings in the aid program which, inste ad of corre cting , the Administra ti o n 
appears bent on compounding. 
The So utheast Asian peoples seek material pro gre ss, it is true . T he y 
s eek it, howeve r, within the framework of the ir two other fundamental ubje ctive s, 
within the framework of national inde pendence and responsible governm e nt. 
These objective s - - all of the m -- c anno t b e r econciled unl e ss the initiative for 
e conomic development in Southeast Asia come s preponderantly fro m the peoples 
of that area . They do not des ire a mate rial progress that i s made to order for 
them in the United Stat.:: s, in Soviet Russia, or anywhere else. They do not 
desire it so desperately thai: the y can b e bought by either sicle. If they could, 
they would hardly be worth the buying. Aid programs, more ove r, no matte r how 
large the amount, no matter how much scintillating surface progre ss it may 
p:t·oduce , will not serve the inte rests of the pe ople of that are a or our intere sts 
unless its benefits reach the people . And unless it ser ves the inte r e sts o f the 
people and not the few, it doe s not serve our interests. 
I regre t to say so but the argume nl that is ofte n made to the effect 
that we must outbid the Russians in offers of aid to Southeast Asia refle cts little 
credit on us or on the nation s of that area. I am sure that the argument is made 
in good faith, out of a genuine desire to he lp. It is an argument, howe ve r, 
which demeans us b e caus e it demeans the p~oples of Southeast Asia . The d e c e nt, 
the self- r e specting, the ind~pendent in Southe as t Asia will r e sent the implication 
that they can be bought . 
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The argument that we must outbid the Russians is as invalid as the 
demand that aid be limited only to those who agree with us in eve ry instance or 
who speak the words which flatter us. Has this country so departed from its 
basic principles, have its citizens so forgotten their training from earliest 
childhood that we would make generosity contingent upon a grovelling gratitude? 
I do not think we have, but sometimes those who speak of these matters make it 
sound as though we have . 
If competition with the Russians is not the sole criterion for aid 
programs, neither is an absolute alignment with us or an adoration of us -- real 
or professed-- the criterion. P o licies change. Leaders go on, at most, for a 
lifetime. The real interest-; of this nation -- interests which members of the 
Senate must consider and sa!~ guard -- are more enduring than that brief span. 
In these terms, the criteria of any aid program is: does it serve our 
interests by aligning itself with the desires of the peoples of Southeast Asia for 
1'\ational independence, for material progress, and for responsible and humane 
government. Regardless how amiable the recipients, it does not serve our 
interests if it encourages de pendence rather than independence; if it becomes 
e. means for irresponsible governments to become increasingly irresponsible. 
In general, I believe rational programs of technical assistance, of 
this government or the United Nations, administered withvut political strings, 
serve the long-range interests of this government. Congress sponsored that 
type of activity when it established the technical ass1stan~~ program in 1950. It 
is the only type of long-range continuing grant aid which Congress has ever 
endorsed. 
1 
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With respect to other aid programs, however, it seems to me that 
each situation must be judg~d on its merits as it arises. In certain cases, as 
in South VietNam for example, where a difficult economic transition is being 
made under constant communist pressure, additional assistance may be 
warranted in our interests. Such aid programs, however, must be clearly 
designed to achieve a given purpose over a set period of time. They should not 
carry an implication of a continuing, general commitment by this country. 
If other foreign assistance in economic deve lopment is required by 
Southeast Asia beyond that which is now available through existing credit 
facilities, then it seems to me preferable that it be financed by long-term loans 
of the most generous terms, rather than as grants. Loans carry no implication 
o f dependency, and I believe the Southeast Asian nations would prefer them to 
grants. It is strange, to say the least, that the agitation for grants seems to 
arise more in the Executive Branch in this country than in Southeast Asia itself. 
I should like to turn now to one other question before concluding. 
The contention is often made that we must increase not only our military and non-
military aid, but also our so-called psychological activity . I am not sure that I 
understand precisely what increasing psychological activity means but I assume it 
has something to do with multiplying the output of words printed or spoken since 
the United States Information Agency is seeking $50 million in additional appro-
priations, or a 57 percent increase over the current year. It would be 
interesting to know how many additionaL words can be produced for that sum. 
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Some years ago the able Senator from Arkansas /Mr. Fulbrigh~/ 
and the able Senator from Iowa j_Mr. Hickenloope;:,7 headed an investigation of 
this program which helped to reorganize it on a sound and reasonable basis. It 
appears now that the Administration desires to return it to a basis of sound and 
fury. 
There is a place for an intelligent information and exchange program 
in supporting and disseminating the foreign policies of this nation in Southeast 
Asia. The Fulbright Program and the Smith-Mundt Program for the exchange 
of persons, for example, arc a credit to this nation and to the farsightedness of 
the Senators whose names they bear. The American librarie-s abroad, which 
the Senator from Iowa [M.r. Hickcnloope::_7 did so much to safeguard and improv~, 
provide valuable services for the country and its commerce and other relations 
with thl.! se c ountries . I am sure there is even a place for radio and press and 
other modern information services in supporting American policies, provided 
they are handled with intelligence and restraint. 
There is no place for any information program, however, regardless 
of its intent, which sugge~ts, by its very magnitude, a cultural offensive on the 
part of this nation . To thos e who would say that we should do more in this 
connection, I can only r e ply that in my opinion what we are already doing comes 
perilously close to the border of excess . Our desire to make them know is 
understandable but in the process we must not cheapen the finest ideals and the 
deepest beliefs of this nation. 
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I ask the members to consider for a moment certain questions 
which I believe will make this clear. V'hat would ba the reaction in your state or 
in mine to occasional visits of Buddhist prit:sts from Cambodia to study at our 
universities? I think we would be honored by such visits, that we would welcoml..! 
them, if the visitors lived -- as they would -- simply and unassumingly in our 
midst. I should think we would react the same way if they maintained in our 
midst a small library to which Americans could go to study life and cultur~ in 
their country. The examples could be multiplied but what I am trying to make 
clear is that there could be a real utility, an enrichment of our life by activities 
of that kind and most of us would welcome it. 
But suppose twenty or t:i1irty Caml)odians descended on your state 
with the printing pre::; ses, the radios and the other paraphernalia of modern 
communications. Suppose they subjected you day after day, mCJnth after month, 
and year after year to an unceasing flow of word!l on the viTtues of Cambodian 
life and the evils of some other way. You might agree, I am sure, that 
Cambodian life was indeed virtuous. But I also believe that you would begin to 
wonder why these Cambodians had come to your state and after a while you 
would begin to wonder when they were going home. Should we assume that 
Cambodians, Burmese, o r any othe r peoples will act any diffe rently to the 
presence in their midst of a substantial body of foreigners or of an offensive of 
words whether it comes from the United States, Soviet Russia, or any other 
country? 
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To those that would say that this is a cheap way to stop communism 
I can only r eply there is no cheap way nor is there even an expensive way in 
Southeast Asia if it depends primarily on the initiative and energy of this country . 
No country in that region or any other r egion will avoi.d totalitarianism 
primarily through our efforts . Nations find freedom because they hav(;l the will 
to freedom and the native leaders to guide them effectively towards its promise. 
We delude ourselves if we believe that we can substitute either for that will O':' 
that leadership. We will do more harm than good if in Southeast Asia we seek t. 
supply our words and our deeds for the words and deeds that must come only 
from the peoples directly involved. 
Mr. President, I have completed my review of the Southeast Asian 
situation. I should like now merely to summarize the conclusions in t e rms of our 
policies to which this review has led me. 
l. The United States should make clear that it stands solidly behind 
our present obligations under the Southeast Asia defense treaty . At the same 
time, however, we should also make clear that we are always prepared to con-
sider a reduction in our role in the defense of that area under certain conditions. 
The conditions are either a recession in the totalitarian threat to Southeast Asia 
or the strengthening of its defenses by the accession of nations more directly 
concerned to the treaty or by other defensive arrangements. 
2. The Executive Branch should make a careful re - examination of 
the premises under which it dispenses military aid. It must bring into its 
calculations more emphatically than it has in the past such factors as genuine 
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need and capacity of recipient governments in terms of their defense and the 
degree of responsibility which they show to their own peoples. 
Further, the Executive Branch should report as fully as possible 
to the American peopl~ on the cxt~nt to which American equ:.pment has fallen 
into the hands of the communists in Asia. If it fails to do so in the near future, 
then the appropriate committees of Congress might well conside't' a complete 
investigation of this matter. 
3. Non - military grant aid as a permanent element of American 
foreign policy should be limited, as was intended by Congress, ro the Technical 
Assistance or the Point Four Program. If the Executive Branch presents a 
prospectus for a useful ancl d!ective expansion of this program - - and I am not 
at all sure that this is possible -- thl:ln I believe Congress should give it sympa-
thetic consideration. 
Large - scale grants of economic aid to any countr y, when necessitated 
by unusual c i rcumstances I however, should be considered individually on their 
own mer its by the Congress. 
If the Southeast Asian and other underdevelcped c0untries seek long-
r an ge aid for economic development unavailable through £-xi.:;ting sources 1 such 
aid should be considt!red as far as possible lor whole regions a11d on the basis of 
repayable credits of the most generous terms. The Executive Branch should 
present specific proposals in this connection and not seek a permanent b lank 
check which reveals little uf the extent to which this country nlight be committed 
without the clear understanding of the American people and the consent of the 
Senate and Congress as a wh.ok. 
